against federal officials for violations of First Amendment free speech rights, the time has come to revisit the logic of that decision.
The predicate behind Bush was that federal employees had an effective, alternative remedy for their First Amendment claims under the comprehensive framework of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA of 1978), 5 and therefore, it was unnecessary to directly imply a cause of action under the Constitution. 6 The Bush Court concluded that, "claims [that] arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States," do not give rise to "a new judicial remedy" under the Constitution. 7 Under the CSRA of 1978 administrative scheme, federal employees must jump through many hoops before being able to have their constitutional claims reviewed by an Article III court. They must first file their initial appeal of an agency decision with an administrative law judge (AJ) designated by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), next file a petition for review with the MSPB, before finally appealing to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 8 And even when their claim is finally heard by an Article III court, it is heard under a highly deferential standard of review which has historically led to an astronomical affirmance rate of 93%-96%. 9 Given this convoluted process, perhaps it is not surprising that the MSPB administrative scheme is not vindicating the First Amendment Pickering rights of federal employees. 10 But the extent of the problem is truly extraordinary. A first-time 2 "Pickering rights" refer to public employee First Amendment rights to speech, expression, and association. See Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (providing First Amendment speech rights to public employees under framework designed to balance employees' constitutional rights with public employers' efficiency interests). . 6 The Court also concluded in Bush that special factors involving Congress' institutional competence in dealing with federal employment relations counseled hesitation in implying a constitutional judge-made remedy. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90. For reasons further developed below, I also argue that there are no longer "special factors counseling hesitation" which would prevent implying a Bivens right in the federal employment free speech context. See infra Part IV.A. 7 Bush, 462 U.S. at 368. 8 See infra Part III.B. 9 See infra Part III.C. 10 Developments in the Law--Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1635-36 (1984) ("Yet although the [MSPB] has assumed the trappings of judicial power, a review of the major dimensions of the Board's comprehensive analysis of all MSPB Board 11 and Federal Circuit cases involving the First Amendment Pickering claims of federal employees leads to a startling discovery: not a single First Amendment Pickering claim filed by a federal employee against their agency has ever been successful on the merits before either of these adjudicatory bodies. 12 Additionally, the number of First Amendment appeals even being brought in the first place is notably low. 13 The message that federal employees seem to be receiving is that their First Amendment claims will not be treated seriously. Employees are instead left to bring largely ineffective statutory whistleblowing claims 14 or swallow hard. Such jurisprudence--including access to the Board, the standards of review it employs, the remedial powers it wields, and the reviewability of its decisions in the federal courts--reveals a marked disposition to circumscribe the protections afforded federal employees."). 11 It is most likely true that some First Amendment Pickering claims have been successful in front of administrative judges (AJs), designated by the MSPB to hear most initial appeals of federal agency personnel decisions. See infra Part III.A. However, these decisions are not reported and have no precedential value. See ROBERT G. VAUGHN, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD: RIGHTS & REMEDIES § 5.01 at 5-2 (2007). Consequently, it is unclear how successful federal employees have been in these cases overall, but one would think that agencies' would frequently appeal from adverse decisions at the AJ level. One other statistic making it unlikely that there are many of these cases is the fact that 88% of petitions for review from the AJ level to the MSPB are by employees appealing adverse decisions. See infra notes x-x and accompanying text. ("Although Congress has passed laws to protect federal employees from reprisals when they speak up, whistle-blower advocates contend that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has sole jurisdiction over federal whistle-blower cases, has interpreted the laws in a way that makes it almost impossible for federal employees to defend themselves."). Cf. William A. Herbert, Protection for Public Employees Who "Blow the Whistle" Appear to be Inadequate, NEW YORK BAR JOURNAL, Feb. 2004, 20-29, http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resources/Bar_Journal/Bar_Journal_ a state of affairs "impoverishes the value of constitutional rights and constitutional adjudication," 15 and indicates that the agency and court entrusted to decide these cases lack the necessary neutral competence.
It is somewhat puzzling that federal employees find themselves in this predicament. At first blush, it would seem that federal employees are endowed with the same free speech protections as state and local public employees under the First Amendment. Under Pickering v. Bd . of Education, 16 government workers may not be terminated for criticizing their employers on matters of public concern, 17 unless such expression is uttered pursuant to official duties 18 or substantially interferes with the ability of the government employer to provide an efficient service to the public. 19 Justice Marshall set forth the applicable test in Pickering: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 20 In Pickering and its progeny there is no exception or special treatment for federal employees. 21 Indeed, the Supreme Court held in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) 22 that federal employees could not, pursuant to the logic of Pickering, 23 be prohibited from receiving honoraria for engaging in speech of a public concern on matters unrelated to their employment. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a good argument why federal employees should receive different remedies and procedures for the same unconstitutional conduct that their state and local employee counterparts suffer. 30 Indeed, in a related context, the Court has argued for parallel treatment of state and federal employees who violate the constitutional rights of others, recognizing "sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism, as different standards of claims against state and federal actors 'would be incongruous and confusing. '" 31 Consequently, because the administrative scheme set up for federal employee First Amendment speech claims does not provide meaningful remedies, and there is no sound argument why federal employees should have less free speech rights than state and local employees, I argue for a resurrection of an implied Bivens right in these cases.
32
Such protections will not only benefit employees, but all citizens who depend on public employees to bring a substantial degree of transparency and accountability to our representative government.
33
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the new, post-Garcetti five-step analysis for public employee Pickering rights. Part II then examines briefly the history of Bivens jurisprudence, with emphasis on the Court's conclusion that there is no government acting in its employment capacity has not been able to condition employment on workers forfeiting their constitutional rights. 35 Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly asked whether the restrictions placed by government employers on their employees are reasonable under all the circumstances.
36
The reasonableness of a public employer's response to public employee speech involves a complicated five-step analysis. The first step, after the recent case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 37 is to ask whether the employee is speaking pursuant to official duties.
38
In determining what the employee's official duties are, "the inquiry is a practical one" and should focus on "the duties an employee actually is expected to perform." 39 If employees are engaged in such official duty speech at work, the Court has held that they are not speaking as citizens and thus enjoy no First Amendment protection for their speech.
40
Although litigation post-Garcetti is still in its nascent stages, it appears that much of the litigation surrounding Garcetti will focus on a practical assessment of what the official duties of the public employee are, with employers seeking broad definitions and employees more narrow ones. 41 The only things that is apparently clear concerning the 34 775, 816 (1982) ("Implicit in Pickering seems to be a determination that 'reasonableness' is the standard by which to judge the conditioning of public sector employment on a relinquishment of some measure of first amendment rights."). 37 126 S. Ct. 1951 Ct. (2006 . 38 Id. at 1960 ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline."). 39 Id. at 1962. 40 Id. Interestingly, this holding that government workers cannot act as employees and citizens at the same time controverts a previous statement of the Court that a teacher making a presentation before a board of education "spoke both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights. Second, if the employee can show that he or she is not speaking pursuant to official duties, the next hoop that must be jumped through concerns whether the employee is speaking out on a matter of public concern. Under Connick v. Myers, 44 courts are directed to look at the surrounding content, form, and context of the speech to see if the speech involves a matter of public concern. 45 This type of speech "typically [includes] matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment." 46 Sometimes the question is asked whether the speech addresses a "matter of political, social, or other concern to the community," 47 or is worthy of legitimate news interest.
48
If it is determined that the speech merely involved purely private interest, like a employment dispute with one's supervisors, than there is no First Amendment protection for the speech because it does not implicate the core concerns of the First Amendment. 49 Third, if the speech is on a matter of public concern not connected to a public employee's official duties, a court then undertakes the Pickering balance of interests. Under this balancing test, first developed in the pubic school teacher case of Pickering v.
result may be predictable in cases in which it is undisputed that the speech was made pursuant to the employee's official duties, the Court has merely shifted the uncertainty to the scope of the underlying categorization. Rather than the relatively stable balancing process that had become familiar in these cases, the lower courts are now confronted with an inexact classification prerequisite that is already generating unpredictable results."). 42 United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465, 475 (1995) . 43 "When government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification 'far stronger than mere speculation' in regulating it. , and its reading of NTEU, appear to place an outer limit on the additional power of the government over the speech of its employees. While that outer limit is a bit further from the workplace than one might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of work-relatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the ConnickPickering niche and recovers her freedom as a citizen vis-à-vis the government."). Professor Estlund also provides a very helpful diagram outlining the contours of public employee speech post-Garcetti. Id. at _. 44 Here, much emphasis is placed on whether the employee's speech causes a substantial disruption in the workplace.
52
Substantial disruption, in turn, is measured based on such things as "the impact of the speech on working relationships, the harm caused by the speech, the public's interest in the speech, and the employee's relationship to that issue." 53 Paradoxically, this substantial disruption standard appears to constitutionalize the heckler's veto and makes most vulnerable that speech which is the most unpopular and warrants the most protection under the First Amendment. 54 If the balance under Pickering favors the government, the public employee has no First Amendment rights in the speech.
Fourth, if the Pickering balance favors the employee, the employee is then considered to have engaged in protected speech. Next, under the evidentiary framework established in Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 55 the plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that engaging in the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action the employee suffered. 56 Fifth, and finally, if the employee shows that the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment decision, the Government then has the burden of persuasion to show that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the protected employee speech.
57
If the public employer is successful in meeting this burden, there is again no liability. This is because " [t] he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct."
58
Only if the employee can survive this fifth and last obstacle may liability be imposed against the public employer and the responsible agents of the employer. 
II.
SECTION 1983 AND THE BIVENS DOCTRINE As complicated as the framework is in public employee free speech cases, the Court in all of these cases consistently used the term "public employee" to refer to the First Amendment rights of the employees in question. No distinction was made between whether the employee was a state or federal employee. Nevertheless, even though the rights should be the same, the process by which those rights are vindicated, the remedies which are available, and against whom, all turn out to be different for federal and state employees.
A. THE SECTION 1983 DISTINCTION
Plaintiffs brought most of the public employment free speech cases discussed in the previous section pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now referred to by its place in the U.S. Code, Section 1983.
60
To make out a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that there was a deprivation of a federally guaranteed right and that the defendant was acting "under color of" state law.
61
Section 1983 is not substantive; it merely provides a procedural vehicle for plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims against state and local officials.
62
The purpose of such claims is to "vindicate constitutional rights and deter violations through suits brought by injured persons to stop government illegality and to obtain damages for injuries already suffered." Consequently, institutional claims are limited to situations where a plaintiff proves a causal link between the institutional policy or custom of the state actor and the plaintiff's 60 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."). 61 Id. As far what constitutes action under state law in the public employment context, the critical inquiry is "whether the public employee was acting pursuant to the power he/she possessed by state authority or acting only as a private individual. injury.
67
Even then, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment will in most situations bar plaintiffs from collecting money damage claims against state institutions.
68
Although this makes it difficult to recover damages against state employers for constitutional violations, local government employers generally do not fall under the Eleventh Amendment and may still be sued for monetary relief.
69
On the other hand, individual defendants in Section 1983 cases may assert a qualified immunity defense to damage claims. 70 Under this theory, individual state and local officials are only liable if a reasonable official would have known that he or she was violating a constitutional standard that was "clearly established at the time" of the action.
71
Even if qualified immunity is available, however, a Section 1983 plaintiff can still receive injunctive relief against the targeted state or local official.
72
Prevailing plaintiffs may also be entitled to attorneys' fees under Section 1988.
73
A similar statute to Section 1983 to bring actions for constitutional violations against federal employees and their agencies does not exist.
74
This is somewhat surprising given that the Court has "recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for 67 Id. at 694. 68 The man sued the individual federal officers involved in the incident, alleging that the arrest and search were carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment's command against unreasonable search and seizures 81 and that the unlawful conduct caused him humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering.
82
The Court started from the premise that, "it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." It then continued by holding that the plaintiff should also have a claim for money damages against federal agents who violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 84 In this manner, the Court sought to subject federal officials to the same type of constraints state officials are under when dealing with the fundamental rights of United States citizens, 85 and to deter individual federal officers from acting unconstitutionally. 79 However, "[s]overeign immunity bars an action seeking to recover damages from the federal government itself for a constitutional tort." Rosenthal, supra note 74, at 815 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994)). 80 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics was a predecessor agency of the Drug Enforcement Agency. 81 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."). 82 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90. 83 Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 84 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 85 Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2618 (2007) (Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Thirty-six years ago, the Court created the Bivens remedy. In doing so, it assured that federal officials Nevertheless, the Court limited this newly-minted Bivens right for future claims through use of a two step analysis. Under the first step, "there is the question whether any alternative, existing process for the interests amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." 87 In other words, where Congress had already provided an adequate remedial scheme for constitutional violations, it is unnecessary for the Court to craft a judge-made remedy.
88
But even if no such alternative exists, a court must apply the second step of the analysis and undertake a "remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed . . . to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation." 89 Although Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Bivens is fairly straightforward, Justice Harlan's concurrence adds some important insights into the analysis. Most specifically, on the question of "whether the power to authorize damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress' hands." 90 In other words, Harlan did not believe that existence of a damage remedy for constitutional violations should depend on Congressional legislative grace. Instead, he concluded that, "if a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by Congress is thought adequate to empower a federal court to grant equitable relief for all areas of subject-matter jurisdiction enumerated therein, . . .then it seems to me that the same statute is sufficient to empower a federal court to grant a traditional remedy at law." 91 On another significant point, Justice Harlan appeared to be responding to a suggestion that Chief Justice Burger made in dissent that constitutional violations by federal officers should be decided by quasi-judicial or administrative agencies created by would be subject to the same constraints as state officials in dealing with the fundamental rights of the people who dwell in this land."); see also id. ("The Bivens analog to § 1983 . . . is hardly an obscure part of the Court's jurisprudence."). 86 Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) . But see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407-8 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that the appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory relief does not turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct."). 87 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). Somewhat confusingly, this was the second step of the analysis set out in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) , and the second step, involving "special factors counseling hesitation," was the first. Id. at 18. The majority opinion by Justice Souter in Wilkie gives no indication why the order of the analysis was reversed. 88 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 ("For we have no congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agent, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."); see also id. at 410 (Harlan., J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."). 89 Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 378). This "special factors counseling hesitation" language derives from Bivens where the Court noted that a damage action was appropriate because the case involved "no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action of Congress." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 90 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 401 (Harlan, J., concurring). 91 Id. at 405. See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) ("The federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation.").
Congress.
92
Apparently disagreeing with Burger's suggestion, Harlan wrote that, "the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment." 93 Harlan thought this was so especially where "the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities." 94 Nonetheless, he did maintain that the court should consider policy considerations for and against adopting such an implied constitutional right much in the way that the legislature does. 95 Weighing the relevant policy considerations in Bivens, Justice Harlan concluded that there was not any substantial governmental policy which would be interfered with by recognizing a non-statutory damage remedy against federal officials allegedly responsible for a Fourth Amendment violation. The refusal of the current conservative Court to apply Bivens to other scenarios that appear to fall under its logic has led Justice Ginsburg to urge Congress "to codify and further define the Bivens remedy." 106 Whether that might be the most appropriate course will be examined after reviewing the current state of federal employees' First Amendment rights under Bivens.
C. APPLICATION OF BIVENS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT: BUSH V. LUCAS
Given the focus of this paper on the First Amendment rights of federal employees, the most significant finding that the Court has made with regard to the scope of the Bivens remedy is the one it made in the decision of Bush v. Lucas.
107
Bush involved the demotion of a federal employee for allegedly making protected First Amendment statements critical of his federal agency. 108 Although he appealed the adverse personnel decision to the Civil Service Commission and was reinstated with retroactive seniority and full back pay, 109 under the administrative scheme he was not able to receive compensatory damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, or attorneys' fees against the individual federal official. 110 There was therefore some issue over whether the administrative remedy adequately deterred unconstitutional conduct against the federal employee by his federal supervisor. 111 Although the Court assumed that the administrative remedies did not provide complete relief for the plaintiff which would have been as effective as the Bivens damages remedy, 112 the Court nevertheless unanimously 113 concluded that there did not exist a Bivens remedy under the First Amendment "arising out of an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States." 114 More specifically, under the first step of the Bivens analysis, the Court found that there is existed an effective alternative remedy under the Civil Service Commission regulations. 115 The Court defined its mission as making a "policy judgment . . . informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment rights." 116 Under this test, these civil service regulations were found to be "an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations," 117 and it was unnecessary to "interfere with Congress' carefully calibrated system." 118 Even Justice Brennan, the author of the original Bivens decision, agreed with the outcome in Bush, writing in a later case that, "I agree that in appropriate circumstances we should defer to a congressional decision to substitute alternative relief for a judicially created remedy."
119
Brennan believed a substitute alternative remedy under the CSRA of 1978 was an appropriate circumstance because Congress developed the scheme over nearly a hundred years and "'constitutional challenges . . . are fully cognizable' and prevailing employees are entitled not only to full backpay, but to receive promotions, seniority, pay raises, and accumulated leave." 120 Furthermore, the Court found special factors counseling hesitation under the second part of the Bivens analysis. In particular, the Bush Court "recognized Congress' institutional competence in crafting appropriate relief for aggrieved federal employees as a 'special factor counseling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy. '" 121 In this regard, the Court observed that Congress could more expertly evaluate the effect of a new litigation right for federal employees than could the Court.
122
It was not for the Court to decide whether it would be good policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages against government officials in these circumstances where Congress had already carried out the necessary balancing of employee rights and government efficiency interests. This is not to say that they do not have the ability to have their First Amendment claims analyzed under the Pickering framework for public employee free speech claims.
126
They do. The difference is that the framework will be initially applied by an administrative judge (AJ) appointed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 127 Also, even if liability is found, the damages will be limited to equitable relief and back pay. The federal employee will not be eligible for compensatory or punitive damages, and attorney's fees are awarded on a more discretionary basis. 128 Moreover
129
It is therefore necessary to examine in some detail the status of First Amendment retaliation claims under the CSRA of 1978.
130
To the extent that federal employees are not receiving similar treatment for their claims from the MSPB or the Federal Circuit, the two adjudicative bodies responsible for handling the appeals of these types of claims, there is an argument that this alternative scheme is not providing a meaningful remedy. Like Justice Marshall, I believe that a case like Bush v. Lucas should be decided differently in an environment in which Congress' comprehensive scheme is not providing "full compensation to civil service employees who are discharged or disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights. . .and that [does not] afford[] a remedy that is substantially as effective as a damage action." 131 Also, to the extent that the MSPB process is not working the way that it should, it undermines the "special factors counseling hesitation" argument that courts should defer to the institutional competence of Congress to decide these matters of federal employment law. he Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer, but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies.") (emphasis added). 130 Professor Estlund has denominated this question as crucial to whether it makes sense to re-cast public employee First Amendment speech claims into liberty interests due some form of procedural process under the due process clause. See Estlund, supra note 43, at __ ("How good will administrative decisionmakers be at weighing free speech concerns against managers' claims of institutional imperative?"). The Pendleton Act established the Civil Service Commission, which aimed to defeat the spoils system and select federal public employees based on merit by using a competitive examination. 133 Under Section 13, it provided that employees could not be required to make political contributions or be politically influenced at the risk of being terminated.
134
Over the next century, civil service laws were amended to provide federal employees with various employment rights, including just cause protection from termination, and from other adverse employment actions, 135 unless such termination would promote the efficiency of the civil service.
136
Additional laws provided back pay and other make-whole relief for unlawful adverse employment actions. 137 Importantly, Congress decided in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 that granting free speech rights to federal employees was not counter to the efficient operation of the civil service. Under this framework, substantive provisions prohibit arbitrary actions by federal supervisors and procedural provisions provide administrative remedies for addressing unlawful actions taken against the employee.
143
Substantively, the CSRA of 1978 established specific "prohibited personnel practices," including unlawfully discriminatory actions, politically coercive actions, and retaliatory actions for whistleblowing. 144 Significantly, for purposes of this article, covered federal civil servants are able to bring First Amendment claims under this scheme for personnel decisions based on the employee's disapproving or controversial comments about the agency. 145 Procedurally, for an employee to be removed from their position, the burden is on the agency to show that such a removal would promote the efficiency of the service. 146 Before this can happen, however, the agency must give the employee thirty days notice of a proposed adverse employment action and the notice must contain reasons for the actions.
147
The employee, who may be represented by an attorney or another representative, is then given seven days to respond to the proposed action, and before taking final action, the agency must supply reasons for its decision.
148
The employee may appeal the adverse decision under an applicable, internal grievance procedure or to an AJ designated by the MSPB, but not both.
149
The AJ holds "a trial-type hearing at which the employee c[an] present witnesses, cross-examine the agency's witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials." required to issue a written decision. 151 Successful employees are entitled to make-whole relief including reinstatement with back pay, but are not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages.
152
Attorney's fees can be awarded by the Board on a discretionary basis.
153
If the employee does not win at the AJ/initial appeal level, he or she may file a petition for review (PFR) with the MSPB. Regardless of whether the MSPB accepts review, the employee may appeal further to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 154 However, the employee will not be entitled to the full review of their claims before the Federal Circuit like plaintiffs asserting Bivens claims in front of a federal trial court. Instead, the Federal Circuit reviews the MSPB's or AJ's decision under a highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 155 Overall, this federal civil service administrative scheme has advantages and disadvantages as compared to a direct Bivens damage action under the Constitution. Disadvantages include lack of: access to an impartial Article III court (and the politically appointed members of the MSPB in the court's stead), jury trials, 156 the ability to obtain compensatory and punitive damages, full appeal rights in front of the Federal Circuit, 157 and the ability to bring claim against individuals responsible for violation of constitutional rights for money damages (and therefore, there is a loss of significant deterrence interests). Attorney's fees are also more discretionary under the administrative model. On the hand, the administrative process is advantageous to employees as it places the burden of proof on the agency, 158 gives employees due process rights which might provide more effective protection for speech than First Amendment rights alone, 159 151 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1). 152 Id. § 7701(b). 153 Id. § 7701(g)(1) (adopting for most adverse employment action cases "interest of justice" standard). 154 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (d). 155 "The decision of the MSPB must be affirmed unless we find it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence." Holland v. Dept 159 This is the argument advanced by Professor Estlund. Estlund, supra note 144, at 124 ("[T]hose employees who enjoy independent due process rights--who cannot be fired without a good reason or without notice and a hearing--should be expected to enjoy much greater freedom of expression as well."). I wonder, however, whether in a potentially politicized environment like the MSPB whether such procedural rights will really help? Although civil servants have the advantage of putting the burden on agencies to "reasonably investigate and evaluate whatever facts it is relying upon before imposing serious discipline," id. at 128-29, the danger is that such investigations will be form over substance where political considerations are involved and another reason why the independent Article III court is necessary. On the other hand, if due process is defined as "the right to notice of the charges and to a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker at which the employer must show just cause for discipline or discharge and the employee may respond," id. at 129, I do not believe that federal employees are entitled to an impartial decisionmaker pre-termination under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) , and the MSPB, as discussed below, seems far from an impartial administrative decisionmaker post-termination. See infra Part III.B.
negates the need to argue against qualified immunity in order to obtain damages, 160 and provides a process that is likely to be more accessible, quicker, and cost less money. 161 To determine whether the advantages of the MSPB process for deciding First Amendment claims of federal employees outweighs the disadvantages or vice versa, it is necessary to consider whether the established alternative remedy to a direct constitutional claim is providing "meaningful redress" to impacted federal employees. In other words, it is necessary to explore how the MSPB and the Federal Circuit have been handling First Amendment retaliation claims of federal employees to determine whether a Bivens remedy is necessary in this sub-class of cases. 162 It is to this topic that the next two subsections turn.
B. THE MSPB EXPERIENCE HANDLING FIRST AMENDMENT PICKERING CLAIMS
The state of protection for civil service federal employees who speak out on controversial issues of public concern has never been good. Indeed, the state of affairs was so bleak that the Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) 163 to give federal employees more protection from retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights in the workplace in matters of reporting waste, fraud, or abuse. 164 But even after passage of the 1989 law, Professor Estlund was able to conclude based on findings from a 1992 report that:
[M]any employees who observe wrongdoing do not report it, that many of those who do so perceive employer retaliation, albeit of a comparatively mild variety, and that many of those who do not report wrongdoing attribute their unwillingness to speak out to the fear of retaliation. 165 Indeed, Congress in 2007 is seriously considering the first "enhancement" to the WPA in eighteen years. 166 Currently, however, fear of retaliation in the federal workplace for 160 The answer appears to be based largely on the structure and the characteristics of the MSPB (or Board), which hears appeals of personnel actions brought by over two million covered federal employees. 268 (1981) ). This article focuses on the First Amendment, but the impact the federal whistleblower statutes have on this area of the law cannot be ignored. The presence of such whistleblower laws has both given federal employees alternative means to hold their government employers accountable, but has also proven something else: that such laws do not effectively fill the gap left by the lack of First Amendment protection, contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertions in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 , 1960 . 169 See Estlund, supra note 43, at __ ("While the experience of employees with First Amendment claims under the federal civil service laws, where these claims were channeled by Bush v. Lucas, would be instructive, it would be difficult to evaluate that experience and to extrapolate to the much larger and more varied universe of state and local employment."). I do not attempt, however, to undertake the difficult extrapolation of the federal experience to state and local employment in this article. 170 There are approximately three million federal workers in the United States. The MSPB received over 8,500 appeals of civil service personnel decisions this past year.
176
Of these, about fifty percent in any given year involve adverse employment action claims, involving terminations, suspensions, demotions, failure to promote, etc.
177
The standard in such cases is whether adverse employment actions are supported by such cause as will promote the efficiency of the public service.
178
Most of these appeals are initially heard by AJs designated by the Board at five regional offices throughout the country.
179
Unsuccessful parties before the AJs (mostly employees) may file petitions for review (PFRs) with the Board.
180
In recent years, there has been between 1,000 and 2,000 PFRs, with the large majority (anywhere from 84% to 94%) resulting in the Board not changing the AJ decision.
181
The large percentage of unchanged awards is based on the relatively high standard a PFR must meet in order to be reviewed by the MSPB. Petitions are granted "only when significant new evidence is presented to [ discussed below, represent the pattern in almost all of the cases decided on the merits: a finding that the employee did not speak out on a matter of public concern under a narrow view of what a public concern is, and then an alternative argument that even if public concern speech is involved, the employee's First Amendment rights are easily outweighed by the countervailing efficiency interests of the employer. When Chambers became concerned about how Park Police were being deployed post-9/11 and the lack of budgetary resources, she shared her dissatisfaction with a Washington Post reporter in comments published in December 2003. 193 Almost immediately, she was placed on paid administrative leave and her superiors proposed to remove her from her position because she had discussed security and budgetary matters with third parties and did so without going through her chain of command. 194 She brought whistleblowing and First Amendment retaliation claims under the civil service regulations after her official termination. 195 The administrative law judge upheld her dismissal finding that she had disclosed sensitive security and budget information, failed to carry out supervisor's instructions, and failed to follow the chain of command. 196 On the First Amendment issue, the AJ held that she did not speak as a citizen and therefore, under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 197 had no First Amendment protection.
198
The Board granted the PFR and affirmed the AJ decision. 199 Specifically on the First Amendment claim, the Board recognized that public employees have constitutional rights under Connick and Pickering, but then stated the applicable Federal Circuit precedent as requiring that, "[e]mployees' free speech rights must be balanced . . . against the need of government agencies to exercise 'wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.'" 200 Nevertheless, the MSPB decided the case under Garcetti, finding that her speech to the reporter was pursuant to her official duties and thus, not protected by the First Amendment. 201 In support of this conclusion, the Board noted that Chambers had contested a gag order that would not allow her to speak to the press under any circumstance because it was her job to speak to the press about agency issues. 202 The Board thus defined the scope of her job duties based on how they believed Chambers perceived them. 203 As I have argued elsewhere, Garcetti is a prime example of poor judicial reasoning and opinion writing that will hopefully go the way of Bowers v. Hardwick.
204
Be that as it may, even applying Garcetti to the facts of this case, not all public employee speech is created equal 205 and the Board seems to think that whenever a federal employee talks to a newspaper, that employee must be talking in their official capacity. Yet, the Board fails to do the functional analysis of job responsibilities that Garcetti requires. 206 Moreover, the Board came to this conclusion even though the Court in Garcetti specifically mentioned that a public employee speaking to a reporter on their own time would likely not be speaking pursuant to official duties. 207 It certainly was not Chambers' duty to criticize her employer for its security and budgetary decisions. Indeed, the criticism is most comparable to the Pickering case itself where the school teacher wrote a letter to a newspaper criticizing the school district's budgetary decisions. 208 In short, this legal reasoning of the Board majority is highly questionable and suggests a desire on the part of some Board members to favor the interests of the federal employer over its employees.
209
Because the case was filed prior to Garcetti, the Board also concluded in the alternative that Chambers would have lost her case under pre-Garcetti law. 210 Here, the Board found that although Chambers spoke out on a matter of public concern, she lost out in the Pickering balance because police officers, and especially chiefs of police, have less First Amendment protection than other public employees.
211
This categorical approach to Pickering balancing, however, is at odds with the individualized balancing required based on the specific facts of the case.
212
Because of the serious public safety concerns that Chambers had, it is not at all clear that the harm caused to working relationships by her criticisms were outweighed by the benefit to the public interest in safety in having someone with Chamber's knowledge comment on the current state of affairs for the Park Police. All the Board majority states in defense of its position is: "[C]onsistent with the decisions cited above, the agency had an overriding interest in not having the Chief of the Park Police publicly question decisions made by officials who outranked her concerning the functions and budget of the Park Police." 213 Yet, if that was always the case, there would never be any First Amendment rights for public employees who as citizens believe they are uniquely situated to bring concerns about the government to other citizens' attention. Indeed, the Board seems to recognize this itself when it cites a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that, "[t]he public's interest in learning about 'corruption' or 'wrongdoing' by government officials will usually foreclose discipline against a public employee who reveals such activities, even when the speaker is a law enforcement officer with limited First Amendment rights."
should not apply. 215 In short, the Board's analysis is lacking, superficial, and inconsistent with the type of competent, legal analysis required in these types of cases. 
217
Smith involves the 30-day suspension of a Department of Transportation employee for using in an allegedly unauthorized manner government documents to support his equal employment opportunity claim revolving around an allegedly racially discriminatory failure to promote.
218
Smith claimed, among other things, that the 30-day suspension violated his First Amendment rights to challenge the allegedly discriminatory promotion decision.
219
Because the AJ sustained Smith's initial appeal on other grounds, there was no need to discuss his First Amendment claims. 220 However, the First Amendment claim became relevant again when the Board overturned some of the AJ's conclusions on the civil service provisions.
Although recognizing the constitutional speech rights of all public employees under the Pickering framework, the Board relied on an interpretation by the Federal Circuit which placed a heavy thumb on the scale on the side of the government's interests. 221 Under the Mings test, "Employees' free speech rights must be balanced . . . against the need of government agencies to exercise 'wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. '" 222 But the Federal Circuit in Mings made a glaring legal mistake by suggesting that this "wide latitude" language concerns the balancing of employee and employer interests under Pickering. Instead, the "wide latitude" language concerns the threshold question of whether or not the employee is due some First Amendment protection because they are speaking on a matter of public concern. The full language of the quote from Connick is:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government 215 Id. So only when public employee speech is on language not on a matter of public concern does the employer have wide latitude to manage their offices, not when the expression is important to public debate. When public concern speech is involved, as the Board in Smith eventually assumes for the sake of argument, 224 a much more delicate balance between employee First Amendment interests and governmental efficiency issues must be done.
225
By citing the Federal Circuit in Mings, the MSPB therefore compounds the twenty-year mistake by again undertaking the wrong balancing of interests.
The Board also makes two mistakes in discussing whether the filing of an EEO complaint is speech on a matter of public concern. Although the Board correctly recognizes that, "a discussion regarding racial relations or discrimination is a matter of public concern entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment," 226 it cites to circuit court precedent for the proposition that the complaint has to be public 227 and that the filing of a discrimination claim that is "personal in nature and limited to the complainant's own situation involves a matter of purely private interest."
228
As to the Board's first point, the Supreme Court clearly held in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District 229 that a racial discrimination complaint made in a private conversation could still be on a matter of public concern. This principle was later reaffirmed by the Court in Rankin v. McPherson, 230 in which private, negative comments about the assassination attempt on President Resident were found to touch on matters of public concern. 231 Indeed, a closer look at the Eleventh Circuit opinion cited by the Smith majority shows that the Eleventh Circuit understood that, "a court cannot determine that an utterance is not a matter of public concern solely because the employee does not air the concerns to the public," 232 though an employee's attempt at public disclosure may be relevant. However, in a situation where the speech concerns claims of racial discrimination, which are "inherently of public concern," 233 it is not clear how the fact 223 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 224 Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 80. 225 Brown v. Dept. of Transp., FAA, 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 226 Id. at 79 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 8 (speech protesting racial discrimination is "inherently of public concern")). 227 Id. (quoting Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir.1997)) ("In determining whether an employee's speech relates to a matter of public concern or to his own private interest, courts also consider the employee's attempts to make the concern public and the employee's motivation in speaking."). 228 that the claims were not publicly aired is dispositive.
Similarly, the Board's cursory conclusion that an EEO complaint is merely personal in nature indicates a foundational misunderstanding of the dual purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 234 and similar federal and state antidiscrimination laws. Here, the Board is not alone in its misunderstanding of employment discrimination law, but is joined by the Second and Seventh Circuits in this error. 235 The purpose of employment discrimination laws is both to make the individual whole for unlawful discrimination and to vindicate the public interest in eradicating employment discrimination from society as a whole. 236 To say that an EEO complaint only serves one's own purposes is to totally ignore the public interests vindicated by such laws and the complaint filed by Smith.
237
This is not to say that the MSPB necessarily arrived at the wrong legal conclusion, but only that the Board lacks the necessary tools to undertake the sensitive balancing of relevant interests that need to be considered in cases such as this one. As a result, federal employees' First Amendment rights to free speech are unnecessarily sacrificed.
Perhaps, the lack of neutrality and competency on the part of the MSPB would be bearable and less worrisome if there was meaningful judicial review by an Article III court. Unfortunately, as the next section illustrates, that is not the case. . 1988) ). The better view is that espoused by the en banc Third Circuit in Azzaro: "In rejecting this notion [that discrimination must be systemic to be of a public concern], we do not suggest that all public employee complaints about sexual harassment are matters of public concern. We do believe, however, that under all of the surrounding circumstances, Azzaro's reports address a matter of public concern even though they referred to a single incident." Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 980; see also Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 269 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Complaints of sexual harassment are not per se matters of public concern; whether such complaints are in any given case depends on the content, form and context of the complaint. Applying that standard to this case and viewing the complaints in the light most favorable to Campbell, we conclude that Campbell's complaints about sexual discrimination do amount to matters of public concern."). 236 
C. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT EXPERIENCE HANDLING FIRST AMENDMENT PICKERING CLAIMS
As noted above, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from the MSPB concerning adverse employment decisions. 238 There does not appear to be that much divergence in how First Amendment Pickering free speech claims are handled by the MSPB as opposed to how they are treated by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, in 2006, the MSPB proudly reported that 93% of its decisions were affirmed by the Federal Circuit. 239 The mostly likely reason for this high affirmance rate is because of the highly deferential standard of review in such cases: "The decision of the MSPB must be affirmed unless we find it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence." 240 In other word, this is in no way the type of review a First Amendment claim brought directly to a federal district court would receive if brought under Bivens or a Section 1983 federal analogue. 241 In fact, the First Amendment MSPB cases involving the free speech Pickering analysis for federal employees follows this overall pattern to the same degree. Every single Federal Circuit case that decided a First Amendment issue on the merits found in favor of the government agency. 242 This is not surprising from the perspective that,"[t]he opinions of the courts place great emphasis on hierarchy of command in defining government interests, including interests in efficiency." 243 Overall, the last twenty-five years has witnessed the Federal Circuit uphold ten out of ten decisions for federal agency employers on the merits. 244 Every single one of these cases found against the First Amendment rights of public employees or, in the alternative, declared that it did not have jurisdiction over the First Amendment claim or that it was unnecessary to decide the constitutional claim because of the resolution of the civil service statutory cause of action.
Both of these latter two procedural ways for dismissing federal employee First Amendment claims also highlight the shortcomings of the MSPB/Federal Circuit administrative scheme. For instance, if the Federal Circuit overturns the Board and reinstates an employee who has suffered an adverse employment decision based on civil service provisions, the court finds that it need not address the First Amendment claim at all.
245
Although this is consistent with Ashwander doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 246 this approach cheapens the value of constitutional rights and the importance of constitutional adjudication.
247
Perhaps even more problematic is the situation where because the underlying prohibited personnel action does not amount to a covered employment decision under the civil service laws, the Federal Circuit finds the Board did not have proper jurisdiction over the claim and thus, the court cannot hear the claim either. 
249
In other words, in these cases not covered by the jurisdiction of the MSPB, the employee is left with no First Amendment claim at all, let alone a meaningful or effective one.
250
The high affirmance rate is to be expected for at least one other potential reason. As a general matter, federal courts of appeal usually defer to the expert agencies that have been given broad discretion in interpreting the statutes over which they have authority. 251 Thus, the deferential standard of review cited to above. Something else is afoot. Although hard to prove, it might have to do with the way MSPB members are appointed and their lack of competence as either non-attorneys or lack of familiarity with the ins-and-outs of the Pickering framework. 254 Now, with time comes experience, but the affirmance rate suggests that the Federal Circuit is none too eager to disagree with the MSPB on federal personnel manners. Also there is just not that much experience with such claims, with one Westlaw law inquiry establishing that the Federal Circuit has heard a total of 79 First Amendment cases in its twenty-five year existence, 255 while hearing some 5741 patent cases during that same period.
256
In all, the Federal Circuit's track record of only finding for agencies on federal employees' First Amendment Pickering claims does not inspire confidence, suggests some political bias in the system toward agencies, and highlights the relative lack of experience of the court in these types of constitutional matters. As a result, the only Article III court review that these claims are receiving is not meaningful or effective under any definition.
IV. REVITALIZING THE FIRST AMENDMENT PICKERING RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
The first thing that strikes anybody who studies First Amendment JF-2) ). 255 There were actually 142 results, but the Court of Claims, the Federal Circuit predecessor, heard the other cases prior to 1982. 256 The queries run in the CTAF (Westlaw Federal Circuit database) were: "'first amendment' % patent! copyright! trademark!" and "patent! and da (after 1982)," respectively. 257 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
but that does not keep them from also bringing First Amendment claims. 258 Second, the available empirical evidence suggests that federal employees who bring claims under the WPA are highly unsuccessful. 259 So unsuccessful indeed that Congress is currently considering enhancements to employee protections under the WPA. 260 The better answer appears to be that federal employees are not bringing such claims because there is no reason to think that such claims have any chance. And who can blame federal employees? When every single MSPB and Federal Circuit First Amendment Pickering case decided on the merits comes out in favor of the employer, employees and their attorneys are going to learn very quickly that these adjudicators lack the requisite neutral competence and that these types of claims are simply a waste of time. 261 All this leads me in the next two subsections to call for a revitalization of federal employee First Amendment Pickering claims either under Bivens or an extension of Section 1983 to violations under color of federal law.
A. BRING BIVENS BACK FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
The purpose of this section is not to argue that Bush v. Lucas was wrongly decided in 1982. Indeed, it would be hard to do that considering that it was a unanimous decision, with the author of Bivens himself, Justice Brennan, joining the opinion. 262 Rather than attack the logic of Bush, this section argues that its underlying assumptions are no longer valid twenty-five years after it was decided.
Most specifically and to the point, federal employees are not able to receive a meaningful or effective remedy for their First Amendment claims under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 263 Empirical analyses do not lie and the lack of any success of such claims at the Board or federal appellate level explains why there is little to no First Amendment activity. It is certainly not because the federal civil service has become magically immune from everyday employment disputes. Instead, employees are turning to the equally deficient WPA, 264 swallowing hard and doing nothing, 265 or just leaving the federal service and taking their talents elsewhere. 266 If the CSRA of 1978 was providing a meaningful, effective remedy for the First Amendment claims of federal employees, there would be every reason to argue that the Bivens remedy in this context was not necessary. Unfortunately, that is just not the case. Since the Bush case, I have not been able to locate one instance of a Pickering analysis being applied by the MSPB or Federal Circuit in which the employee comes out on top. 267 Truly remarkable.
Nor is there reason to believe that there should not be a Bivens claim because of "special factors counseling hesitation." When Bush was decided, the thought was that Congress had spent a hundred years putting together a comprehensive civil service system which would attract and keep the best and brightest federal employees. 268 It was universally thought that Congress had the institutional competence, nay incentive, to formulate a civil service system which would prevent partisanship and provide the best employees for the national government. 269 I do not claim here that the CSRA of 1978 has not worked at all. Indeed, outside of the First Amendment context, there is every reason to believe that the system is working as well as one might expect. What I am saying, however, is there is no further reason to defer to the institutional competence of the Congress in not recognizing a direct constitutional remedy for First Amendment free speech claims for federal employees.
For these claims at least, Congress has shown itself singularly incompetent in trying to protect the constitutional rights of federal employees. Whether this is because the MSPB is not neutral enough, 270 not competent enough, 271 or not tested enough with these types of claims, 272 really at the end of the day does not matter. What matters is that the constitutional rights of federal employees are being ignored and sacrificed at an alarming rate.
The only real solution is to recognize that when it comes to First Amendment federal employee Pickering rights, Bivens remedies provide the best alternative of all the options. Under Bivens, federal employees will be able to take their free speech claims directly to an independent Article III court which has much experience adjudicating such claims under Section 1983. 273 Applying similar standards as under Section 1983, federal court adjudication will assure once again a neutrally competent arbiter of federal employees' constitutional rights. Moreover, such claims, with the ability to hold individual federal supervisors and managers directly liable for damages, may lead to a greater deterrence effect than is currently possible under the existing regime. 274 There might be some who claim that my proposal does nothing less that open the proverbial "floodgates of litigation." But the second Justice Harlan answered this criticism well in his concurring opinion in Bivens:
[T]he question appears to be how Fourth Amendment interests rank on a scale of social values compared with, for example, the interests of stockholders defrauded by misleading proxies. Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis [of inundating courts with Fourth Amendment claims], we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. 275 In short, "[t]he 'floodgates' argument . . . has been rehearsed and rejected before." 276 In any event, the statistics of Section 1983 cases just do not bear out that such a flood would arise from the recognition of a Bivens claim in this context. 277 With a much larger number of state and local employees in this country, 278 the federal courts are still more than adequate to handle existing Section 1983 causes of actions. 279 It is hard to believe that another three million federal employees, about one-sixth the size of their state and local counterparts, will cause irreconcilable problems.
In short, it is time to face the fact that the civil service scheme does not adequately vindicate constitutional First Amendment Pickering rights of federal employees. It is therefore time to permit Bivens claims in this context.
B. THE ALTERNATIVE: SECTION 1983 FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
There is, of course, another way to provide more effective constitutional protection for federal employees: Congress could provide a statutory-based, Section 1983-like action to federal employees. 280 All that would take would be for Congress to pass a Civil Rights Act that would either add "under color . . . of any federal or State law" to Section 1983 or propose a new statute with "under color . . . of any State law" substituted with "under color . . . of any federal law." 281 After that, all other principles of municipal liability, including sovereign and qualified immunity, under Section 1983 would apply equally to federal officer's violations of the Constitution. 282 Compensatory and punitive damages would be available against individual federal government officials accused of violations of the constitution. 283 This legislative approach has the advantage of being less problematic from a separation of powers standpoint and would arguably place the power to create a remedy The solution to this inequitable state of affairs can only be reinvigoration of federal employee's First Amendment free speech rights through overturning the decision in Bush v. Lucas and implying a direct Bivens remedy. Alternatively, Section 1983 could be expanded by Congress to provide a statutory basis for federal employees to bring constitutional tort claims against federal agents for violating their constitutional rights under color of federal law. Only by taking one of these necessary steps can we be "assured that federal officials w[ill] be subject to the same constraints as state officials in dealing with the fundamental rights of the people who dwell in this land." 288
